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Researchers and managers stress the importance of long-term technology strategies to 
develop technological capabilities for global competitive advantage. This paper explores 
the relationship between technology decision-making and strategy in technology transfer 
(TT) in developing countries, with special reference to South Africa. Earlier research by 
the authors considered technology and operations integration in developing countries and 
identified factors that were important to managers in the management of technology. The 
paper proposes five decision-making levels as the basis of a framework for TT, and 
investigates the strategic issues pertaining to TT at these levels. Four South African cases 
studies are used to propose a framework that combines important items in technology 
transfer and levels of decision-making. The research suggests that technology plays a 
limited role in strategic decisions in developing countries, and that expectations from new 
technology are largely operational. Broader implications for managers are identified.  
 




Globalisation presents formidable challenges to developing countries as they struggle to 
compete in world markets. As technology assumes importance in many businesses, 
technology policy is crucial in strategic decision-making and increasingly focuses on 
global considerations (Lall, 1993). The extent to which firms in developing countries are 
able to enter the global market depends on their ability to acquire and use new technology, 
and on how they can foster knowledge-based competitive advantage. A decisive feature 
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will be the extent to which managers meet such demands by developing core technologies 
into a knowledge, competence and high-tech skills context (Wang, 1997). 
Developing countries are less likely to benefit from factors that, in the developed world, 
typically lead to the increasing availability of technology from external sources: (1) rapid 
global growth in scientific and engineering knowledge; (2) availability of venture capital 
and the formation of numerous start-up companies; and (3) an expanding pool of displaced 
talent resulting from reengineering and corporate downsizing  (Chatterji, 1996). 
The purpose of this paper is to study the strategic component of TT in developing 
countries, with specific reference to the manufacturing environment in South Africa. A 
model is derived from links and associations established between factors that are 
important in technology decision-making, and the levels at which decisions are made, 
based on a framework by Salami and Reavill (1997). Four case studies are used to study 
the relationships between elements in the proposed model. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the broader implications for technology managers in developing countries. 
 
TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Technology decisions are a critical component in strategic portfolio selection (Gagnon and 
Sheu, 2000). First-mover advantage through technological capability is achieved by 
combining internal and external resources that lead to faster access and exposure to new 
technologies located beyond an individual firm’s boundaries (Harris et al, 1996). 
Competitive advantage may further be gained by opening or exploiting windows of 
opportunity through knowledge and intangible assets that typically focus on external 
technology relationships and the application of physical assets. When a new portfolio of 
products renders existing technologies and competencies obsolete, first-mover status is 
eroded through the change from what was once a new product into a commonplace 
commodity. A broader range of products appears, appealing to additional markets that 
demand flexibility and quick responses (Lee et al, 2000). 
When technology policies result from upfront negotiation between users in developing 
countries and prospective suppliers, the latter frequently emerge as indispensable business 
partners (Carayannis, 2000). A major challenge for manufacturing firms is to reach short 
and long-term compatibility of strategic objectives, and to embed order qualifying and 
order winning criteria. In conditions of technological and environmental uncertainty, 
relationships should be flexible with a limited need for control (Hoffman and Schlosser, 
2001). While this emphasises the importance of articulating and restating strategic 
objectives, the danger exists that excessively prescriptive objectives narrow the focus of 
the technology user and restrict the scope for innovation. In high-technology operations, 
competitive advantage is increasingly derived from the transfer of knowledge and 
intangible assets between acquirers and suppliers, as knowledge-based products become 
pillars of competitive strategy. 
Collinson (1999) proposes three “domains” in technology and knowledge products: 
technology-as-hardware (products, machinery), the knowledge-base (systems, suppliers, 
customers, environment), and routines (to develop and apply the knowledge-base of the 
firm). Routines are observable and transferable, and are a major focus of restructuring and 
change as firms improve their performance or respond to new conditions. While it is 
appealing to study a routine as a relatively stable knowledge construct, the forces of 
routinisation can be disrupted by events that raise new issues and require re-examination 
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of old problems. This emphasises the importance of studying the dynamics of inter-
organisational processes (Judge and Ryman, 2001). 
At an operational level managers in developing countries are under increasing pressure to 
produce better results more efficiently, despite the adverse effect of a lower technology 
base on learning and knowledge acquisition (Lado and Vozikis, 1996). Firms in 
developing countries do not possess skills, capabilities and financial resources to develop 
new technology. Structural and political changes such as deregulation and privatisation 
have stimulated the flow of technology to developing countries, where the role of new 
technology extends beyond cost-efficient production processes. Customers expect quality 
and conformance to specifications, reliability and flexibility of supply, and confidence in 
the ability to provide long-term innovative capacity and to ensure financial viability 
(Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000). Kumar and Jain (2001) claim that a technology ‘anchor’ 
should be established and remain within a country to propagate further technological 
development. It is possible to identify certain technological bases in some developing 
countries, but these have yet to develop into broad operational improvements. 
Salami and Reavill (1997) propose a framework showing TT as a series of steps. The first 
step addresses decisions for selecting technology, macro-level agreements between the 
technology owner and acquirer, and identifies the needs of the acquiring country and the 
acquirer’s goals and objectives. The second step evaluates available technologies. The 
third step is concerned with technology selection, considers human factors, and evaluates 
costs and benefits. The fourth step studies the actions of the supplier and acquirer during 
implementation, in terms of guidelines for human resource and management issues, and 
criteria for appropriate adaptation of new technology. The fifth step re-evaluates factors 
pertaining to performance criteria, modifications, and innovative developments. This study 
concentrates on strategic issues at levels 1 and 2, with some reference to levels 3 and 4. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
The framework described in the previous paragraph is useful for understanding TT. In 
order to establish which specific issues require investigation at each step, the authors 
conducted a survey to ascertain factors deemed to be important in TT in a developing 
country context (see Hipkin and Bennett (2002) for detailed results). A combination of the 
framework by Salami and Reavill (1997) and the survey results is used in this paper to 
analyse strategic issues pertaining to TT in four manufacturing companies in South Africa. 
 
The preliminary survey 
A sample of 230 South African managers attending management development 
programmes at the University of Cape Town from 2000 to 2002 was used to determine 
important items in TT. The 30 managers attending the first course selected for the study 
were asked to list the issues they believed were important in TT. After the authors had 
eliminated overlapping items, 80 items were used. All managers then scored how 
important these 80 items were in TT. Follow-up interviews, structured around the factors, 
were held with 42 managers in order to clarify and explain emerging results. Using factor 
analysis, the items were grouped into 14 factors, as shown in Table 1, which also shows 
the number of items grouped into each factor heading. The items specifically grouped 
under the strategy factor are also listed. 
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Table 1 - Factors identified as important in TT 
Factor heading  No of items under 
each factor heading 
Factor heading No of items under 
each factor heading 
Technology  9 Maintenance 5 
Economic/political  8 Technology integration 5 
Knowledge  7 Maintenance planning 5 
Supply chain  8 Management policies 4 
Strategy*  10 High-tech issues 3 
Operations management  7 Financial 3 
Contractual  4 Resistance to change 2 
  
*Items grouped under strategy Level in framework 
Statement of clear objectives to be achieved by new technology 1 
Technology implemented because of market demand (demand-pull) 1 
Technology as strategic resource for competitive advantage 1 
Technology to assist in shift from product to process base 1 
New business climate (global markets) 1 
Alignment of business goals, systems and technology 1 
Distinctive competency to be derived from technology 2 
Technology permits revisit of vertical integration 2 
New relationships with stakeholders 3 
Ways of managing new technology (FDI, licensing, JV, partnership, etc) 4 
 
The case studies 
Four South African case companies were studied to analyse the items deemed to be 
important in relation to the steps identified by Salami and Reavill (1997) in TT. In these 
companies new technology took the form of replacing, upgrading or automating existing 
lines, with the objective of improving quality and achieving consistently higher output. 
Interviews were held with 3 or 4 individuals in each organisation, and also with 2 
technology suppliers. The following paragraphs contain brief details of the cases. 
 
Flourmill 
“Flourco” is a flourmill with 50-year old equipment and new control systems introduced 
to automate the process. The control system was upgraded because the mill had to meet 
tighter delivery schedules and achieve consistently higher quality standards. Changes in 
the government regulations presented the mill with many new challenges. 
 
Manufacturer of plastic film 
“Plastico” manufactures food packaging plastic film for the retail markets that have 
exerted pressure to reduce prices. The product range was expanded to include fast-food 
customers and exports. Recent plant upgrades were aimed at improving equipment 
availability and monitoring quality to meet export quality requirements. 
 
Food processing plant 
“Foodco” installed new technology for processing vegetables for supermarkets and fast-
food outlets. The company adheres to international quality standards laid down by 
American fast-food corporations. Flexible production is essential because customers have 
different quality standards and demand freshly processed products on a just-in-time basis. 
 
5 
Manufacture of aeroplane seats 
“Airco” produces fibreglass structures for passenger aeroplane seats that are exported to 
Boeing, BAe and other aircraft manufacturers. IATA regulations require strict adherence 
to deflection and structural standards. Airco purchased a semi-automatic machine to assist 
in the manufacturing and curing process as this is essential for correct bonding and 
layering. 
 
Methodology and derivation of a revised model 
As part of a larger research project to link the Salami and Reavill (1997) framework with 
the items identified as being important by South African managers in the preliminary 
research, this study looks at strategic issues. Each item from the preliminary research was 
categorised by the authors at a certain level (e.g. each item grouped under the strategy 
factor was allocated to a level of the framework, as shown in Table 1), and discussions 
with the case organisations concentrated on decisions and activities at each level. 
It became apparent that respondents did not see the applicability of certain items in the 
original framework. At Level 1 needs, capabilities, advantages and disadvantages of the 
acquiring country are sought, as well as the acquiring firms’ goals. Managers did not 
consider the question relating to country needs to be relevant to them, although they 
acknowledged that these might be appropriate when governments were setting technology 
policy for a country. At Level 2, reference is made in the original framework to an 
analysis of basic economic and technical factors affecting TT. Again, managers did not 
see the relevance of this question in their firms. 
An interview template was created with the items from the preliminary research allocated 
to an appropriate level, and assessed in conjunction with the questions at that level from 
the Salami and Reavill framework. A model is proposed (Figure 1), where the items 
relating to strategic issues from the preliminary research are summarised at the appropriate 
level. Of the ten strategic items in Table 1, six are categorised at Level 1, two at Level 2, 
and one each at Levels 3 and 4. 
 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The discussions with staff in the case organisations provide a number of useful 
perspectives at each level in the model shown in Figure 1. This section considers the 
strategic items identified in the preliminary survey in relation to the elements in Salami 
and Reavill’s model (other items are not discussed in this paper). 
 
Level 1 
Managers saw the introduction of their new technology purely in the context of their own 
organisations so macro-economic and national issues were not considered in decisions for 
selecting technology. In all case organisations, new technology was required to meet 
increased market demand in terms of production output and quality. All cases were subject 
to rigorous quality standards. Flourco’s products had to comply with state regulations as 
well as customer quality specifications. Foodco was subject to standards laid down by 
international fast-food chains. Clingco was obliged to meet the standards of its European 
and South African customers. Airco’s specifications were set by IATA regulations. 
The shift from a product to a process base was only significant in Airco’s case. The use of 
new technology to cure the product correctly during manufacturing greatly improved its 
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structural characteristics and led to considerably fewer rejects. The superior manufacturing 
process was evident in many ways, such as avoiding air entrapment that produces 
microbubbles and the removal of creases that would otherwise lead to poor bonding. 
Results from destructive testing demonstrated to the customer the value of the new 
technology. Airco managers were convinced that new technology placed the company in a 
position of considerable competitive advantage over competitors. 
In the other case organisations, the processes whereby flour was milled, food was 
processed, or film was made, were not important to the customer. Quality was measured 
solely through inspection of the finished product. The process itself had no effect on the 
inherent functionality of the final output. 
Decisions for selecting technology were aligned with business goals in terms of satisfying 
customer requirements. Flourco and Plastico were limited in their choice of technology as 
new systems and machines had to be directly compatible with existing production lines. 
Flourco, Plastico and Foodco set their business aims as production targets (e.g. tons per 
hour or specified quality levels). Airco’s goals were also production-related, but the 
company was further looking to keep ahead of its competitors. Only Airco viewed the 
technology from a strategic perspective. The other cases saw no direct link between 
technology decisions and strategic direction, suggesting they investigated technology in 
terms of meeting operational objectives. At Level 1 none of the firms had paid much 
attention to the management system requirements of the new technology. 
 
Level 2 
At this level technology acquirers undertake surveys of all technologies capable of 
meeting their goals. For Airco it was essential that the new technology should achieve a 
distinctive competency whereby its production process would yield superior products to 
those of the competition. In the other case firms, competencies were sought that would 
render the products as good as competitive products. Foodco’s strategy considered the 
extension of activities in terms of vertical integration by undertaking all screening and 
cleaning of raw products, packaging (and ultimately, delivery on a just-in-time basis). 
When considering alternative technologies, firms were unable to undertake rigorous cost-
benefit analyses, and the differences in output and quality produced by one technology 
over another could not be dimensioned with any great degree of accuracy. Managers were 
unable to quantify the benefits of new technology. They could not definitively ascribe the 
retention of a customer to one new technology or be sure they would have lost a customer 
if the technology had not been acquired. While the cost of technology was readily 
available, firms indicated they were unable to identify and quantify other costs, such as 
setting-up internal systems to support the technology. As long as the technology could 
deliver operational requirements, managerial intuition determined the final choice. 
The case organisations were aware of the shortages of technically skilled staff in South 
Africa, as well as political and labour issues, such as increased workforce unionisation and 
affirmative action, but did not specifically consider human resources at the technology 
analysis and survey stage of technology selection. Managers were concerned that the 
novelty and complexity of some technology presented difficulties for an unsophisticated 
workforce, but a specific technology would not be rejected just because it introduced 




Final selection of technology takes place at Level 3. The important stakeholder 
relationships were those with suppliers. A supply chain concept was not utilised as main 
and subsidiary technology suppliers were managed on a project basis through contractual 
agreements. Project managers were instrumental in installing and commissioning the 
technology, but were not charged with assuming the role of promoter or champion. 
Generally managers waited until the new lines were operational before establishing 
specific reporting and management information systems. As with Level 2, formal cost-
benefit analyses were not carried out. 
When firms were negotiating with suppliers, training and support were always raised. In 
deciding on a technology, respondents chose the most appropriate and affordable 
technology, assuming their staff would develop the requisite skills. Managers were passive 
in their technology selection in that a supplier’s solution to the acquirer’s requirements 
was accepted with little debate on the applicability of the technology. Acquirers did not 
influence the level of complexity or robustness of the technology. Compatibility was 
considered a technical interface issue, and not viewed from a human resource perspective. 
Training courses and familiarisation sessions were used to ‘diffuse’ knowledge. 
 
Level 4 
Implementation and maintenance (Level 4) are not strategic issues, although managers did 
feel that strategic objectives influenced the way they managed new technology. 
Production output and quality determined policies towards maintenance, rework, and 
performance measurement. Difficulties arose because of widespread lack of knowledge at 
all levels. It is understandable that managers are not familiar with the detailed operation of 
a new production line, but for example, Flourco managers did not know the capabilities of 
the new control system, expecting far more from the plant than the design parameters 
allowed. Operators attended training programmes, but training needs had not been 
analysed. There was insufficient opportunity to work with suppliers during 
commissioning, resulting in limited technology assimilation. While no supply chains were 
in operation, respondents reported good relationships with suppliers. Discussions with 
some suppliers revealed their frustration with the lack of commitment and technical 
competence of many operations staff. This was exacerbated by skills shortages, especially 
in instrumentation and control. 
Level 5 (evaluation and modification) is not considered in this study as none of the Level 
5 items in the preliminary research were deemed to have strategic implications. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS 
The activities set out in the framework by Salami and Reavill (1997) constitute one aspect 
of TT. A second aspect includes other important items in TT. From a strategic perspective, 
the case firms were preoccupied with internal matters, and not broader factors pertaining 
to politics and the national economy (crime, infrastructure, and so on). Apart from Airco 
(which sought to improve its distinctive competency advantage over its competitors), the 
other cases wished to match competitors’ core competences. Rather than viewing 
technology as a strategic resource, managers only considered the operational side. This 
limited perspective does not look beyond existing products, and only seeks greater 
operational efficiency. This agrees with much of the literature, which suggests that output, 
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quality and delivery are the most important aims for developing countries when acquiring 
new technology. 
It appears from three of the cases that technology is acquired to produce more of a better 
product. The implication for developing countries is that this may meet the low cost 
demands of consumers, but that there is limited innovative thinking that seeks competitive 
advantage through process technologies. Operational efficiencies generally support 
strategic objectives in a passive and neutral way. 
At Level 2, technology was instrumental in expanding strategic thinking in two instances. 
Airco sought distinctive competency and Foodco’s extended its activities through vertical 
integration. The other firms used technology for operational purposes (quality and output). 
Technology was not selected on the basis of cost-benefit analyses because of the difficulty 
in quantifying benefits. Human resources were not taken into account when analysing new 
technology options. Managers, particularly at Airco and Plastico, did acknowledge that a 
degree of automation was introduced to compensate for poor operator skills, but the more 
complex equipment in turn exposed deficiencies in maintenance abilities and skills. 
Familiarisation through training was part of the solution. Suppliers felt in some instances 
that ‘first world’ technology was too complex for some ‘third world’ applications. While 
the long-term solution is a general upliftment of skills, developing countries will continue 
to suffer from poor education and training. Managers were adamant that if developing 
countries are to compete globally, their technology must be comparable to that of their 
competitors. Lower production costs give developing countries some advantage, but lower 
labour costs will not compensate for inferior quality or poor delivery and service. 
Human resource considerations at Level 3 include contentious issues such as affirmative 
action and black empowerment, but these did not directly affect TT. Technology was 
selected on the basis of cost and the ability to meet output specifications. Suppliers 
determine the details of the technology, within overall contractual constraints, implying a 
passive acceptance of a supplier’s technology. Knowledge was acknowledged as a 
valuable asset, but managers did not consider this as a strategic resource in a developing 
country context. Knowledge would only play a role once skills levels had been raised, and 
this will take years to achieve. 
Respondents felt that implementation and maintenance (Level 4) were poorly managed. 
Supplier training during commissioning was undertaken, but greater benefits would have 
resulted from more extensive contact with suppliers. Acquirers underestimated the training 
required, and the basic education and skills of some technical staff were too low for them 
ever to become fully competent. Little adaptation of technology was undertaken because 
suppliers installed equipment as they would anywhere in the world, apart from making 
allowances for specific operating context requirements. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The model illustrated in Figure 1 proposes a number of strategic items corresponding to 
the appropriate levels in the Salami and Reavill framework, suggesting that technology 
decisions should take market demand into account and the importance of shifting from a 
product to a process technology base to achieve competitive advantage. These should be 
aligned with business goals, systems and technology in order to achieve strategic 
objectives. Analysis of technology should consider distinctive competency and vertical 
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integration requirements. Final selection should accommodate stakeholders to ensure 
effective management of the new technology. 
The research suggests that operational demands rather than strategic considerations 
determine technology selection, with limited regard for shifting to a process base. 
Objectives for new technology are stated in operational rather than strategic terms, in 
order to achieve parity with competitors rather than a distinctive competitive advantage. 
Technology was not extensively used in vertical integration decisions. The main 
stakeholders were technology suppliers who have an essential role in training user staff, 
particularly as developing countries suffer from severe shortages of skilled personnel. The 
research suggests that developing countries do not yet use technology for strategic 
advantage, and that technology decisions focus excessively on operational considerations. 
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Figure 1 – Levels of decision making in technology transfer and strategic activity 
1. Identify needs and 
demands of acquiring 
country/firm
2. Identify macro and 
micro issues for use of new 
technology
3. Identify acquirer’s goals 
and objectives
1. Identify technologies to 
meet acquirer’s goals
2. Identify cost and 
benefits of new technology
3. Evaluate technology on 






Level 2: Analysis 
and survey of 
technology
1. Determinate basic 
human factors for adopting 
imported technology
2. Evaluate final costs and 
benefits of new technology
3. Determine relevant 
technology suppliers
Level 3: Selecting 
technology
1. Importance for suppliers 
involved in management 
and implementation
2. Importance for training 
and other HR issues





1. Criteria for evaluating 
process performance
2. Guidelines for 
modification of technology
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Management of new technology
Elements at each level 
(Salami and Reavill)
Strategic items
(from preliminary research)
